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RIGHT TO COMPEL TESTIMONY OF EXPERT
WITNESS EMPLOYED BY ADVERSE PARTY
In Thomaston v. Ives,1 the Supreme Court of Connecticut con-
sidered whether a litigant may call upon an adverse party's expert
witness to testify. Thomaston involved a condemnation proceeding
in which the state had hired an appraiser whose report was un-
favorable to the state's position. The landowner, aware of the ex-
pert's opinion, sought to compel him to testify at trial. The court
allowed his testimony. The court held that in eminent domain
proceedings the owner of condemned property may compel a real
estate appraiser employed by the state to testify if he is not
offered as a witness by the state.2 In so ruling, the court denied
the state's contention that the expert's opinion was privileged and
that its use depended on a contractual relation. The court held
that there is a duty to arrive at a fair value of property in con-
demnation proceedings. This duty required that ". . . [a]ll ma-
terial and relevant information which will assist the trier in deter-
mining the sum of money which will constitute that just compen-
sation should, in justice to both parties, be made available to him."s
The Thomaston decision was limited in two respects. First,
the opinion emphasized that the case did not involve an issue of
pre-trial discovery. 4 Second, the court refused to extend the right
to require expert testimony beyond eminent domain proceedings.
This Note will consider three questions raised in Thomaston:
(1) the extent to which an expert can claim the attorney-
client privilege; (2) the expert's right to receive additional com-
pensation as opposed to his duty to testify; and (3) the right to
1. 239 A.2d 515 (Conn. 1968).
2. 239 A.2d at 518.
3. Id.
4. Discovery (not all jurisdictions have extensive discovery pro-
visions) is concerned with narrowing the issues and enabling an attorney
to prepare himself to challenge an adverse party's case. During the trial,
however, the attorney will probably already know the opinion of the
adverse party's expert and seeks to get that opinion into evidence. The
need to find one's own expert and to prepare for cross-examination of the
opponent's expert witness are no longer present. Thus it has been said
that the requirement of an expert witness to testify in pre-trial discovery
does not lay a foundation for requiring him to testify at trial. 4 J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.24 (2d ed. 1964). In addition most courts have been
unwilling to extend the work product defense available to an attorney at
pre-trial discovery to expert testimony of an adverse party's witness at
trial. Nielson v. Brown, 232 Ore. 426, 374 P.2d 896 (1962). See also cases
cited notes 20, 25, and 27 infra.
compel expert testimony as a matter within the discretion of the
court.
I. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Cases applying the attorney-client privilege to expert testi-
mony treat the expert as an intermediary between the client and
his attorney and invoke the privilege on an agency theory. Wig-
more stated this agency relation as follows:
A communication, then, by any form of agency employed
or set in motion by the client is within the privilege.
This includes . . . communications originating with the
client's agent and made to the attorney. It follows, too,
that the communications of the attorney's agent to the
attorney are within the privilege, because the attorney's
agent is also the client's sub-agent and is acting as such
for the client."
The cases which support an attorney-client privilege as encom-
passing expert testimony have necessarily expanded the definition
of "agent" to include experts hired either by the client or attorney.
This expansion is based on the theory that protection of such re-
lationships is socially desirable as a "promotion of justice, public
health, and social stability. ' 7 For example, State v. 62.96247
Acres of Land8 involved a land condemnation proceeding in which
an appraiser was employed by the state. But he also assisted the
state's attorney in preparation of the case. The appraiser was not
required to testify on behalf of the defendant landowner. The
court resolved the issue of whether an attorney-client privilege
was present by construing the expert as an agent of the state. The
court upheld application of the privilege by ruling that an attor-
ney-client privilege should not be strictly defined. Definition of
the privilege should depend on an analysis of the fairness, neces-
sity, and justice required to protect communications of an expert
to an attorney necessarily made in reliance on the privilege.
This desired protection will therefore not permit the landowner
to make use of the state's preparation, such a use serving only to
place a premium on laziness.9 It should be noted, however, that
the court also based its decision on the role of the expert as
"assistant counsel" in the preparation of the case.
A similar adoption of the agency theory to invoke privilege is
found in San Francisco v. Superior Court10 which was an action
for personal injuries against a city. The plaintiff's attorney re-
5. San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26
(1951); State v. 62.96247 Acres of Land, 193 A.2d 799 (Del. 1963); Brink v.
Multnomah County, 224 Ore. 507, 356 P.2d 536 (1960).
6. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2317 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
7. State v. 62.96247 Acres of Land, 193 A.2d 799, 807 (Del. 1963).
8. 193 A.2d 799 (Del. 1963).
9. Id. at 813.
10. 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951).
Notes
quested an expert physician to examine the plaintiff. At trial the
defendant attempted to call this expert witness, but the court
did not require the expert to testify. The court held that the
expert made the examination at the request of the injured party's
attorney, making him an intermediary for communication between
the injured party and the 'attorney. Even though no physician-
patient privilege existed, the plaintiff was allowed to invoke the
attorney-client privilege."' The privilege was extended in the
belief that full disclosure of facts by the client to his attorney is
desirable. The benefit thus derived justified the risk that unjust
decisions may result from the suppression of evidence. 2 The ex-
pert, by transferring information from the client to the attorney,
performed the role of an intermediary and the communication
was therefore privileged.' 3 When the communication originates
with the expert, however, he is not transmitting a client's confi-
dences and, contrary to Wigmore's description of the agency rela-
tion,1 4 the privilege should not apply.' 5
Brink v. Multnomah County'6 involved eminent domain pro-
ceedings. The court again refused to require an expert employed
by the adverse party to testify. While the Oregon court refused to
recognize an appraiser-client privilege, the expert was made an
agent under Wigmore's definition 7 and the attorney-client privi-
lege was applicable. The court emphasized the adversary nature
of the judicial system. The litigant who desired certain testimony
had the opportunity and did present his own expert version of
value. Further, to allow a litigant to prove his case through his
opponent's preparation places a premium on laziness. In addition,
the court stressed the role of the expert as a "Deputy District
Attorney" in the preparation of the case.'8
Assuming that an expert falls under Wigmore's definition of
an agent, 9 it is necessary to examine the fundamental character-
11. Id. at 237, 231 P.2d at 30.
12. Id.
13. People v. Donovan, 57 Cal. 2d 346, 369 P.2d 1 (1962), stated that
the element of confidentiality existed in the San Francisco case because
the patient, at the request of his attorney, revealed to the physician
characteristics of both his mind and body which would normally be con-
cealed. Id. at 356, 369 P.2d at 6.
14. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6.
15. See note 28 and accompanying text.
16. 224 Ore. 507, 356 P.2d 536 (1960).
17. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6.
18. 224 Ore. at 516, 356 P.2d at 540 (1960).
19. The leading authority which allows an expert the benefit of the
attorney-client privilege assumes that he is an agent of the client or attor-
ney. Cases cited note 5, supra. Wigmore states that exemptions from the
istics of the attorney-client privilege and its applicability to agents.
Wigmore states that such an examination must start with the pri-
mary assumption of a general duty to testify, and that any exemp-
tions from this duty are exceptional.2  The cases cited expanding
the attorney-client privilege to cover expert testimony have not
adopted this strict application of the privilege. But such a con-
struction seems more desirable in view of the effect of the privilege
to exclude otherwise competent testimony. The strict view of the
matter lends itself to the establishment of fundamental conditions
necessary for the privilege to apply.
21
One requirement for a privileged communication is that it must
originate in the confidence that it will not be disclosed, such
confidentiality being essential to the maintenance of the relation.
There are cases which indicate that courts do not consider com-
munications between real estate appraisers and condemning au-
thorities confidential in this sense. In Rancourt v. Waterville
Urban Renewal Authority2 2 an expert engaged by the condemning
authority to appraise the premises was required to testify on be-
half of the landowner. The court did not sustain the applicability
of the attorney-client privilege since opinion on the fair value of
real estate does not require secrecy. "The opinion of the expert is
a fact which the fact finders may be entitled to know. The cry of
privilege does not stop the court and jury from hearing the opinion
of the expert in the search for the truth."2 8 The viewing of ex-
pert opinion as an unprivileged fact was similarly stated in State
v. Steinkraus.2 4 There an expert employed by the state to make
an appraisal was required to testify on behalf of the landowner.
In refusing to apply a claim of privilege, the court ruled that an
expert's opinion is not a communication originating out of any
professional confidence necessary for the privilege to exist. In-
stead, it is a fact which constitutes evidence and which cannot be
communicated to the attorney in the expectation that it will be
privileged.2 5  However, as in Thomaston v. Ives, the court did
limit its decision to the role of an expert appraiser in eminent
domain proceedings.
26
Another case illustration that communications of experts do
general duty to testify are exceptional, and the investigation of truth
necessitates restriction and not expansion of these exemptions. 8 J.
WIGmOR, infra note 18. The examples of agents given by Wigmore do not
include experts hired by the client or attorney (see 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 6) and to expand his definition of agent to include experts seems to
be contrary to the desire to restrict exemptions.
20. 8 J. WiMoRE, EvIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
21. Id. § 2285.
22. 223 A.2d 303 (Me. 1966).
23. Id. at 305 (emphasis added).
24. 76 N.M. 617, 417 P.2d 431 (1966).
25. Id. at 620, 417 P.2d at 432.
26. Id. at 621, 417 P.2d at 433.
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not originate in confidence is People v. Donovan.27 In this emi-
nent domain proceeding the California court refused to apply the
privilege to the expert, even though it was conceded that the ex-
pert was an agent of the state and his communications to the
state's attorney were privileged. Here the landowner did not seek
a disclosure of that communication but only sought the opinion of
the expert as to the fair market value of the property. The court
found that this was an inquiry which goes to the matter of the
appraiser's subjective knowledge and not his disclosures to the
state's attorney. The knowledge was not privileged and did not
acquire a privileged status merely by its communication to the
attorney.28 A subsequent California decision, Oceanside Union
School District v. Superior Court,29 interpreted Donovan as hold-
ing that an appraiser does not pass to the attorney information
that has emanated from the client. Thus the appraiser is not
transmitting a client's confidences."'
To find that an opinion formed by an expert becomes a fact
which the trier of fact is entitled to know, and that communica-
tion of this opinion does not originate with the client, is an accept-
able rationale that no confidential communication results. In
addition, since an expert is hired with the intention that he will
testify at trial, his communication to his employer does not originate
in confidence but in anticipation of giving testimony. It is sub-
mitted that the better view is that the confidential relationship
necessary to a claimed privilege does not exist between expert
and attorney.
Wigmore's other conditions necessary for the creation of the
attorney-client privilege require a relationship which ought to
be "sedulously fostered," and an injury to this relationship by the
disclosure of the communication greater than the benefit gained
for the correct disposal of litigation."1 There is no doubt but that
the attorney-client privilege should be preserved. But courts have
yet to find need for the general establishment of an employer
expert privilege.3 2 Some courts, however, have expanded the
attorney-client privilege to include expert testimony. 3 In some
27. 57 Cal. 2d 346, 369 P.2d 1 (1962).
28. Id. at 355, 369 P.2d at 5; see State Highway Comm'r v. Earl, 143
N.W.2d 88 (S.D. 1966).
29. 58 Cal. 2d 180, 373 P.2d 439 (1962).
30. Id. at 189, 373 P.2d at 445. But see State v. 62.96247 Acres
of Land, 193 A.2d at 815 (Del. 1963).
31. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIENCE. § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
32. Cases cited notes 13, 19 supra.
33. Brink v. Multnomah County, 224 Ore. 507, 356 P.2d 536 (1960).
situations an expert's communication should be protected under
this privilege. The cases noted earlier where experts acted as
assistant counsel are good examples. But it generally appears that
the privilege should not be expanded to encompass communications
between the expert and his employer. One argument against
such an expansion is that the benefit gained through expert testi-
mony for the correct disposal of litigation outweighs the injury
to the relationship between the expert and his employer. The
impact of denying a privilege to expert testimony will not serve
to destroy the role of the expert in litigation but will direct that
role towards a more useful result.
fl. RIGHT TO DEMAND EXPERT FEES
Whether an expert witness may refuse to testify for failure
to receive adequate compensation was an issue also raised in Thorn-
aston v. Ives. There the court distinguished between the duty
of a witness to testify to factual matters within his knowledge
and the requirement that he state his opinion as an expert. The
court stated that the duty of every witness to testify to factual
matters is not the dispositive factor when a party calls the
opposition's expert to testify.3 4 The alternatives, then, are whether
the duty to testify to factual matters within one's knowledge should
be extended to an expert's opinion, or whether the duty of an
expert witness to attend trial and testify as to his opinion arises
solely from contract.
Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances v. Philadelphia5 is a leading
case on this issue. There an expert was allowed to refuse to
testify in the absence of prior agreement between the litigant and
the expert. " [T] he private litigant has no more right to compel a
citizen to give up the product of his brain than he has to compel
the giving up of material things."3 6 However, the court did state
in dictum that a sovereign power may compel an expert to testify
for the sake of public justice. Stanton v. Rushmore3 7 was an
attempt by a doctor to recover expert witness fees for testimony
at trial for which the doctor had been subpoenaed. The court held
the doctor was entitled to expert witness fees from the person who
subpoenaed him. The knowledge and skill of experts are not the
property of litigants, and neither justice nor public policy com-
pels that this property be taken without the owner's consent.88
It should be noted that the doctor was not asked to perform any
type of examination by the subpoena but was asked to give his
opinion as to facts already within his knowledge. A similar ruling
34. 239 A.2d at 517 (Conn. 1968).
35. 262 Pa. 439, 105 A. 630 (1918).
36. Id. at 442, 105 A. at 630.
37. 112 N.J.L. 115, 169 A. 721 (1934).
38. Id. at 116, 169 A. at 721.
Notes
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is found in Buchman v. State,"' a criminal proceeding in which
the court called upon a physician to give his opinion. The Supreme
Court of Indiana ruled that the physician may be required to testify
to facts but cannot be required to testify as to his professional
opinion without compensation. An expert's opinion is in the
form of services and "no man's particular services shall be de-
manded without just compensation.
'40
Another case allowed an expert to demand additional fees for
his testimony. In People v. Thorpe,41 a tax certiorari proceed-
ing, the relator subpoenaed an involuntary expert who had pre-
viously prepared an appraisal of the property. The court required
the expert to testify to what he had seen on the premises, but did
not compel him to answer any questions connected with his ex-
perience and judgment as an expert. The court in dictum men-
tioned that other states required experts to testify, but limited
their testimony to opinions which they are able to give without
study of the facts or other preparation.4 2 The court found this
rule quite unsatisfactory due to the inability of an expert to testify
impromptu; however, such testimony is not impromptu since the
general rule limits the testimony to opinions previously formed
from facts of which the expert has knowledge.
It has been offered that an expert should not be entitled to
additional compensation because, among other reasons, the ex-
pert is not asked to render professional services but merely to
testify as to what he already knows or believes. 43 Some courts
hold that an expert's previously formed opinion is an admissible
fact to which he may be required to testify.44 Jones, in his treatise,
notes that some decisions hold permissible statutes authorizing the
39. 59 Ind. 1, 25 Am. R. 619 (1877).
40. Id. at 11, 25 Am. R. at 623. The court stated that the services of a
lawyer required to defend the indigent are similar to the services of an
expert called by the court. Therefore, since the lawyer receives com-
pensation for his efforts, so should the expert. The dissenting opinion,
however, held that the role of the lawyer required to defend the indigent
and the expert required to testify in court are dissimilar. "The one case
is compelling one man to render services to another for his private good,
the other is compelling him to render services to the State for the public
good." 59 Ind. at 19 (1877) (dissenting opinion).
41. 296 N.Y. 223, 72 N.E.2d 165 (1947).
42. Id. at 225, 72 N.E.2d at 166.
43. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2203 (McNaughton rev. 1961), and
cases cited note 50, infra.
44. Rancourt v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority, 223 A.2d
303 (Me. 1966) (opinion of expert is a fact which fact finders may be en-
titled to know); Philler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 120 N.W. 829
(1909) (if from observation or hypothetical facts an expert has in mind an
opinion, such opinion is a fact as to which he may be required to testify).
courts to allow experts extra fees. However, the prevailing view
places experts under the same obligation to give testimony as
other witnesses which, in the absence of special preparation, en-
titles them to the same fees.
45
In Flinn v. Prairie County,40 it was held that an expert who
testified for the state could not demand compensation in addition
to the usual witness fees unless he was compelled to make special
preparation. The court referred to the duty of every witness to
testify as to information pertinent to the issue, whether such in-
formation constitutes fact or opinion.4 7 This duty, imposed upon
lay and expert witnesses alike, was also found in Dixon v. Peo-
ple.48 The court rejected the contentions of the expert on three
grounds: (1) the actual loss of time while on the witness stand
is equal between lay and expert witnesses; (2) the expert is not
performing services but is merely making a statement as to what he
already knows; and (3) in light of the first two reasons and the
general duty of every witness to testify, the expert's testimony
does not constitute particular services for which he should be
compensated.
40
A strong argument can be made that an expert's knowledge
is his personal property and should be compensated when put
to use. But such use contemplates special preparation imposed on
the expert to enable him to arrive at an opinion. When such
preparation is not needed or when the expert has already formed
an opinion based on facts within his knowledge, the opinion is
equivalent to a fact admissible in evidence. The expert's duty to
testify to these facts should be no different than that of a lay wit-
ness.
Where an expert does not receive an additional fee for his
testimony, the question may arise as to whether a litigant may
require an expert employed by the adverse party to testify without
paying him. The question is not simply a matter of what com-
pensation experts should receive, but whether they are liable to
compulsory process unless such compensation is tendered before-
hand. If an expert is not entitled to additional compensation, he
should be liable to compulsory process from either a litigant or the
court! 0
45. 4 B. JONES, EVIDENCE § 879 (5th ed. 1958).
48. 60 Ark. 204, 29 S.W. 459 (1895).
47. Id. at 207, 29 S.W. at 460.
48. 168 Ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897).
49. Id. at 195-96, 48 N.E. at 110. The court ruled upon similar facts
in ex parte Dement, 53 Ala. 389, 25 Am. R. 611 (1875), that an expert is
required to testify as a matter of public duty, and his time as well as the
time of a lay witness is claimed by the public as a tax paid to a legal sys-
tem which protects his rights. Id. at 392, 25 Am. R. at 617.
50. San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26
(1951) (dictum); Logan v. Chatham County, 113 Ga. 491, 148 S.E.2d 471
(1966); Swope v. State, 145 Kan. 928, 67 P.2d 416 (1937); Nielsen v. Brown,
Notes
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On the other hand, jurisdictions which grant an expert addi-
tional fees have stated that the duty of an expert witness to attend
trial and testify is created by contract. Where an expert em-
ployed by one of the parties is called to testify by another, ". . . it
is not only his privilege but his duty to refuse compensation from
one of the parties where he has already accepted employment from
the other .. .*"r Jurisdictions which refuse to grant an expert
additional fees will not allow him to refuse to testify due to a
prior contractual relationship. Instead, they create a duty to bring
forth relevant information, even though it may be obtained
through professional service rendered at the request and cost of
another.
52
III. MASSACHUSETTS RULE OF DISCRETION
Massachusetts courts have treated the problem of compelling
expert testimony differently, leaving the enforcement of the right
to require testimony of an expert employed by the adverse party
to the discretion of the court. Ramacorti v. Boston Redevelopment
Co.5 3 involved an eminent domain proceeding in which the land-
owner requested the testimony of an expert witness employed
by the adverse party. The court stated a general rule: the expert
can be required without the payment of fees to give an opinion
already formed, even though the expert witness may be an em-
ployee of the adverse party. However, the important consider-
ation in such a case is the fairness of such a requirement. Since
the landowner has no difficulty in obtaining experts, it was not an
abuse of discretion of the trial court to deny such testimony.54
Such a rule of discretion could be used effectively to explain rul-
232 Ore. 426, 374 P.2d 896 (1962); see Barnes v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 348
Mo. 1032, 156 S.W.2d 597 (1941) involving a suit by a psychiatrist on a
contingent fee contract. The court held that if the expert was to testify to
matters already within his knowledge, a contract to pay him more than
the ordinary witness' fee would be invalid. However, if the contract re-
quired him to make an examination and then testify, it would be valid to
pay him for his work. Id. at 1038, 156 S.W.2d at 600-601.
51. Hickey v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1952); see cases
cited notes 32, 34, and 38 supra.
52. Cases cited note 47 supra; cf. Oleksiw v. Weidner, 2 Ohio St. 2d
147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965), involving a malpractice action in which the
defendant was required to testify as an expert at the request of the plain-
tiff. The court, citing Wigmore, stated that if the expert's testimony pro-
vides facts which will aid the court in arriving at a just decision, he
has a duty to testify, and this duty is owed to society and not to the
individual parties. Id. at 149, 207 N.E.2d at 377.
53. 341 Mass. 377, 170 N.E.2d 323 (1960).
54. Id. at 379, 170 N.E.2d at 325.
ings in cases where the expert acted as an assistant counsel. It
could also be an effective tool to balance the duty to refuse testi-
mony due to a prior contractual relation with the duty of every
witness to give relevant testimony. The determinative factors to
be considered by the court in weighing these duties are the fair-
ness to the parties and the amount of additional preparation,
if any, necessary for the expert to render an opinion. However,
analysis of the rule indicates that the Massachusetts courts have
refused to require the expert to testify in the absence of a showing
of necessity by the party calling him.55 Such a strict construction
of the fairness requirement may tend to limit the effectiveness of
the rule of discretion.
THOMASTON V. IVES REVISITED
It is submitted that the attorney-client privilege should not be
expanded to include expert testimony. The Thomaston court
stated that the reasoning upholding such a privilege evinces a
primary concern for the rights of the witness to which the ascer-
tainment of truth is secondary. The ascertainment of the truth
should be the primary concern of the courts, even though the
court was unwilling to make a blanket statement to this effect.
The attorney-client privilege should be strictly construed. The
fact that an expert's communication neither originates with the
client nor arises out of any confidential relationship indicates that
experts should not fall under the protection of the privilege. This
is true even if the expert is considered an agent of the client or
attorney. Such a ruling can only increase the effectiveness of the
role of the expert in producing relevant testimony.
Thomaston stated that there is a distinction between the duty
of a witness to testify regarding factual matters and the duty of
an expert witness to testify as to his opinion. This distinction
involves the corresponding issue of whether an expert may be
entitled to additional fees for his testimony. Thomaston held that
an expert is under a duty to testify in eminent domain proceedings
due to the necessity of the landowner to receive just compensation
for his property. Such a holding adopts a rule of discretion, for the
court, unwilling to deny the distinction between fact and opinion
testimony, created a special rule designed to protect the landowner
in eminent domain proceedings. This exercise of discretion may
be the best way to balance the interests of the expert with the
interests of the party calling him. In exercising this discretion
the court should consider that the importance of the expert's prior
contractual relationship is offset by these three factors: (1) the
expert is only asked to testify as to what he already knows; (2)
55. See Roberson v. Graham Corp., 14 F.R.D. 83 (D.C. Mass. 1952)
(property appraisal in connection with probate of an estate); Boynton v.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D.C. Mass. 1941) (expert physician).
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he has prepared his report with the anticipation of testifying; and
(3) it is the duty of every witness to bring forth relevant testi-
mony.
JOHN E. EBERHARDT, JR.
